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Abstract  
 
We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt crisis. We find 
evidence of a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model 
before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. 
The majority of EMU countries have experienced contagion from Greece. There is no 
evidence of significant speculation effects originating from CDS markets. Finally, the 
escalation of the Greek debt crisis since November 2009 is confirmed as the result of an 
unfavourable shift in country -specific market expectations. Our findings highlight the 
necessity of structural, competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and 
institutional reforms at the EMU level enhancing intra-EMU economic monitoring and policy 
co-ordination.  
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1. Introduction  
Recent months have seen the transformation of the global financial crisis into a 
sovereign debt crisis in the euro-area. Starting from Greece in autumn 2009, the euro-area 
crisis has since caused Greece to withdraw from international bonds markets and has put 
intense pressure on the bonds of other EMU countries, most notably Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain. The intensity of the crisis has prompted European policy makers to take extraordinary 
measures aiming to limit its fall-out on the real sector of the affected countries and prevent its 
further spreading. These measures, ratified in May 2009, include an unprecedented in size 
(110 billion euros) three-year EU/IMF-financed emergency rescue package for Greece; and 
the creation of a European stabilisation mechanism ring-fencing 750 billion euros for 
countries that may find themselves in a position similar to the Greek one within the following 
three years. These measures, however, have so far not proved enough to ease the crisis. In 
November 2010 Ireland became the second EMU country to seek and obtain a rescue 
package for 85 billion euros. This event fuelled further debates on issues ranging from the 
optimum short-run response to the crisis to the eurozone’s overall long-term sustainability.  
With so much political and economic capital at stake, it is not surprising that the 
economics literature has responded actively to the eurozone crisis through a series of 
empirical studies. The consensus emerging from this literature, reviewed in section 2, is 
summarised in two main findings. First, both the amount and the price of the perceived global 
risk associated with investments in sovereign bonds, relative to the safe havens of US and 
Germany, have increased during the global economic downturn. This explains the across-the-
board increase in EMU spread values. In this process, the transfer of banking sector risk to 
sovereign borrowers, through bank bail-outs, has been central. Second, intra-EMU 
differences in spreads’ increases are explained by heterogeneous transfer of banking sector 
risk to sovereign borrowers and the pricing of heterogeneous macro-fundamentals. The 
penalties imposed by markets are further exacerbated by the interaction of macro-
fundamentals with the common international risk factor.  
The existing studies have shed much-needed light on the factors driving increasing 
EMU spreads, greatly enhancing our understanding of the eurozone crisis. Important 
questions, however, still remain unanswered. First, almost all existing studies are purely 
empirical. However informative, without a theoretical mapping to the events it aims to 
analyse no study can offer a full set of explanations and traceable future policy implications. 
Second, existing studies have not explained the events characterising the most recent and 
intense phase of the crisis. Why did the Greek spread escalate from 140 basis points in early 
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November 2009 to 250 points by the end of the year and nearly 600 in late March 2009? 
Third, why has the Greek spread been taking so much higher values compared to other 
periphery countries? Is the Greek macro-outlook so much worse than Portugal’s to justify 
spread values two or three times as high? Fourth, has contagion really taken place? Despite 
this widely held belief, no study has so far tested the hypothesis of contagion explicitly. 
Finally, what has been the role, if any, of speculative trading in the market for credit default 
swaps (CDS) on Greek and other EMU government bonds? Such speculation has been 
suggested as one of the potential culprits behind the present turmoil with subsequent 
proposals ranging from tighter regulation of the CDS market to an outright permanent ban on 
naked CDS trading. Are such proposals justified or is the role of CDS speculation 
overestimated in the ongoing debate?    
This paper aims to make a contribution to the study of the EMU sovereign debt crisis 
by addressing each of the five questions raised above. It is the first paper to pursue an 
empirical analysis of the crisis based on a theoretical model, namely the one by Arghyrou and 
Tsoukalas (2010). Using insights from the literature on currency crises (Obstfeld, 1996; 
Krugman, 1998), these authors build a model of the eurozone debt crisis which effectively 
allows sovereign spreads to reflect both currency risk and default risk. Their model offers an 
explanation for all the events characterising the EMU debt crisis up to the activation of the 
Greek rescue package, including the sudden escalation of the Greek debt crisis in November 
2009. The model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas offers testable hypotheses relating to the full set 
of questions posed above. Our empirical analysis puts these hypotheses directly into the test. 
We use monthly data covering the period January 1999 – February 2010, as well as a range of 
specification and estimation techniques (time series and panel-based). Our main findings can 
be summarised as follows:  
First, during the period preceding the global credit crunch (January 1999 – July 2007), 
with the possible exception of expected fiscal deficits, markets priced neither macro-
fundamentals nor the very low at the time international risk factor. This finding is consistent 
with the ‘convergence-trading’ hypothesis, according to which markets were discounting 
only the optimistic scenario of full real convergence of all EMU economies to the German 
one. This pricing behaviour has changed decidedly during the crisis period (August 2007 – 
February 2009), with markets now pricing both the international risk factor and individual 
macro-fundamentals on a country-by-country basis.  
Second, we obtain evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the Greek debt crisis is 
due to a background of deteriorating macro-fundamentals and a double shift in private 
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expectations: Starting from November 2009, Greece was transferred from a regime of fully-
credible commitment to future EMU participation under the perception of fully guaranteed 
(by other EMU countries) fiscal liabilities, to a regime of non-fully credible EMU 
commitment without fiscal guarantees. This regime-shift not only explains the sudden 
escalation of the Greek debt crisis but also the difference in spread values observed between 
Greece and other periphery EMU countries with not too dissimilar macroeconomic outlook: 
Compared to Ireland, Portugal and Spain, markets perceive a much higher probability of a 
Greek voluntary exit from the EMU, and/or a Greek default. In short, Greece’s problems are 
as much about trust as they are about economics.  
Third, we confirm that up to the point covered by our econometric analysis (February 
2010), the overwhelming majority of EMU countries had experienced contagion from 
Greece, most prominently Portugal, Ireland and Spain. This is interpreted as evidence that the 
Greek bond yield has become a proxy for EMU-specific systemic risk, increasing borrowing 
costs in other EMU countries beyond the level justified by the common international risk 
factor and their idiosyncratic fundamentals. In short, the Greek problem has become an 
EMU-wide problem.  
Finally, we do not find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that speculation in the 
CDS market, including the Greek one, is a major force driving the eurozone debt crisis. This 
does not imply that CDS speculation is not taking place or it does not drive EMU spreads at 
higher data frequencies. What it implies is that in the longer-term perspective captured by our 
monthly data frequency, EMU spreads are mainly driven by accumulated intra-EMU 
macroeconomic imbalances and international risk conditions. Although the latter may 
improve as global economic activity gradually picks-up, the former is unlikely do so without 
significant intra-EMU economic/institutional reforms outlined in the concluding section. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on 
the post-1999 determinants of EMU government bonds. Section 3 discusses the theoretical 
framework by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) on which our empirical analysis is based. 
Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents and discusses our empirical findings. Finally, 
section 6 summarises and offers concluding remarks.  
 
2. Related literature  
Existing studies on EMU government bond yields and their spreads against Germany 
can be classified in two broad categories, respectively covering the period prior to and 
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following the onset of the global financial crisis in August 2007.  Both groups typically 
follow the approach of the general literature conditioning yields/spreads on three variables 
(see e.g. Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009):1 First, a common international risk factor, 
capturing international risk appetite. The latter captures both the level of perceived risk and 
its unit price thought to be higher during periods of financial stress. The common risk factor 
is typically measured using indexes of US stock volatility or the spread between the yields of 
various categories of US corporate bonds against US treasury bills. Second, credit risk, 
capturing the probability of partial or total default on behalf of a sovereign borrower. This is 
typically measured using indicators of past or projected fiscal performance.2 Third, liquidity 
risk. This refers to the size and depth of the sovereign bonds market and captures the risk of 
capital losses in the event of early liquidation or significant price changes resulting from a 
small number of transactions. Liquidity is a variable acknowledged to be particularly difficult 
to measure, with bid-ask spreads, volumes of transaction and the level of or the share of a 
country’s debt in total EMU sovereign debt used as proxies. Furthermore, the literature 
acknowledges a high degree of co-linearity between empirical measures of liquidity and the 
global risk factor.  
Studies on EMU government bonds covering the period prior to the global financial 
crisis are not unanimous regarding the role of each of the three determinants discussed above. 
However, the prevailing view can be summarised as follows: First, the international risk 
factor was important in determining spreads against Germany (see Codogno et al. (2003), 
Geyer et al. (2004), Longstaff et al. (2007), Barrios et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Favero et al. (2010)). This effect was particularly 
strong during periods of tightening international financial conditions (see Haugh et al., (2009) 
and Barrios et al., (2009)) as well as for countries with high levels of public debt (see 
Codogno et al., (2003)). Second, credit risk was priced, as suggested by Faini (2006), Bernoth 
et al. (2004), Bernoth and Wolff (2008), Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Schuknecht et 
al. (2009).3 These findings are interpreted by Bernoth and Wolff (2008) and Schuknecht et al. 
(2009) as evidence that the Stability and Growth Pact was a credible mechanism imposing 
                                                 
1 See, among others, Alesina et al. (1992) for OECD countries; Bayoumi et al.(1995) for US states;  Booth et al. 
(2007) for Canadian provinces; and Laubach (2009) for the US federal government.  
2 Credit risk includes three types of risk: default risk, capturing the probability of default on coupon payments 
or/and repayment of the principal on maturity date; credit-spread risk, capturing the risk that the market value of 
a sovereign bond will underperform the value of bonds of comparable quality; and downgrade risk, reflecting 
the probability of capital losses due to a bond’s downgrade by leading rating agencies (see Barrios et al., 2009).  
3 By contrast, Codogno et al. (2003) find that markets penalised fiscal imbalances only in two EMU countries 
(Italy and Spain). Furthermore, Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) find that fiscal conditions affected EMU sovereign 
bond yields but this effect had became weaker following the euro’s introduction.  
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fiscal discipline among EMU members. This view, however, is not uncontested: Manganelli 
and Wolswijk (2009) raise the question as to whether the penalties imposed by markets were 
sufficiently high to encourage EMU governments to change unsustainable fiscal policies. 
Finally, the role of liquidity risk is controversial. Codogno et al. (2003), Bernoth et al. (2004), 
Pagano and Von Thadden (2004), and Jankowitsch et al. (2006) find a limited or declining 
liquidity effect on EMU spreads. By contrast, Gomez-Puig (2006), Beber et al. (2009), and 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) argue in favour of a more prominent effect, particularly 
during periods of tightening financial conditions and higher interest rates.4  
Moving to the literature covering the crisis period, consensus emerges on two points. 
First the observed widening in EMU spreads is mainly driven by the increased global risk 
factor. In this process, the role of domestic banking sectors is crucial, with the financial 
system transforming global risk into sovereign risk through two channels (see Gerlach et al., 
2010): First, in periods of financial distress the government might be obliged to recapitalise 
banks using public money, thus increasing its fiscal liabilities. Second, shortages in banking 
liquidity restrict credit to the private sector causing economic recession increasing fiscal 
imbalances further. With national banking sectors having different degrees of exposure to 
global financial conditions the increase in the common global risk factor causes a 
heterogeneous impact on national spreads.5 Attinasi et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), 
Mody (2009), Barrios et al. (2009), Gerlach et al. (2010) and Schuknecht et al. (2010) have 
all established the importance of the global risk factor during the crisis period and its impact 
on the latter through the financial sector.  
The second point of consensus is that during the crisis markets have been penalising 
fiscal and other macroeconomic imbalances (e.g. excessive current accounts) much more 
heavily than they used to prior to the crisis. Furthermore, markets not only attach a higher 
weigh on fiscal imbalances, but they may also price their interaction with the common 
international risk factor (see Barrios et al. (2009), Haugh et al el. (2009), Manganelli and 
                                                 
4 Favero et al. (2010), on the other hand, provide theoretical justification and empirical evidence according to 
which during the early EMU-years liquidity had a smaller effect on sovereign spreads in periods of high risk. 
This is intuitively explained by the fact that in crisis periods investors choose from a reduced set of alterative 
investment opportunities, limiting their willingness to move away from sovereign bonds.  
5 Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) emphasise the role of monetary policy during the crisis, captured by shifts in 
the main refinancing operations rate of the ECB. They argue that interest rates affect spreads through two 
channels. First, low interest rates increase funding liquidity and provide incentives to financial managers to take 
risks to increase expected returns on their investments. Second, interest rates affect a country’s fiscal outlook 
through their effect on the state of the business cycle. They acknowledge, however, that interest rates are 
strongly correlated with risk aversion, in which case the interpretation of their empirical findings is similar to 
the studies quoted above.  
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Wolswijk (2009) and Schuknecht et al. (2010)). Increased focus on heterogeneous fiscal 
outlooks and the non-linearities caused by the aforementioned interaction is another major 
factor explaining the differential spread increases observed among EMU countries. On the 
other hand, on balance, the evidence suggests that although the role of country-specific 
liquidity risk is non-negligible, it is rather limited (see Attinasi et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli 
(2009), Barrios et al. (2009), Haugh et al. (2009), and Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009)).6 
The studies quoted above have shed much-needed light on the factors driving spreads 
during the eurozone crisis, thus enhancing significantly our understanding of the latter. 
Important questions, however, remain unanswered. First, existing studies do not capture the 
most recent and intense phase of the eurozone crisis (November 2009 onwards). Second, they 
are purely empirical. But without reference to a theoretical model of the eurozone crisis, no 
study can provide a full set of explanation of events, and perhaps more importantly, a set of 
traceable future policy implications. Our study fills this void by anchoring its empirical 
analysis to the theoretical treatment of the eurozone crisis provided by Arghyrou and 
Tsoukalas (2010). We proceed to review this model immediately below.  
 
3.  Theoretical background  
Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) present a theoretical model of the Greek/European 
debt crisis. The main insight of their analysis is that the current debt crisis is caused by 
systemic/macroeconomic risk which in the presence of national currencies would have 
resulted into currency upheaval, while in their absence is diverted to the markets for 
sovereign bonds, strongly reinforced by the introduction of default risk. Based on this insight, 
they develop a model of rational EMU exit combining elements from the second- and third-
generation currency crisis models, by Obstfeld (1996) and Krugman (1998) respectively. 
They treat EMU participation as commitment to a system of fixed exchange rates and, 
following Obstfeld (1996), assume one control variable for the government, namely the 
decision to stay in or exit the euro. The government decides rationally its optimal course of 
action by balancing the costs of the two options. The cost of exiting the euro is assumed to be 
constant, given by C. This can be interpreted as the difference between the steady-state 
inflation rates under an independent monetary policy regime and the EMU caused by a higher 
                                                 
6 Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) find a stronger effect for liquidity risk, which they interpret as evidence of 
incomplete integration among national EMU sovereign bond markets. Based on this finding, they argue in 
favour of a higher degree of urgency in completing the ongoing process of intra-EMU financial integration. 
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inflation bias under monetary independence; or/and the political cost associated with a 
voluntary or forced withdrawal from the EMU. The cost of staying in the EMU is a positive 
quadratic function of the deviation of the exchange rate at which the country has joined the 
euro, denoted by s , from the  PPP-consistent exchange rate, denoted by s*. This deviation is 
captured by the value of the real exchange rate q = (s* – s ), a variable summarising the 
effect of all macroeconomic shocks (internal and external) hitting the domestic economy. 
Overvaluation relative to the PPP-consistent equilibrium is costly, as it reduces external 
competitiveness leading to lower output, increased unemployment, higher external and public 
debt and higher interest payments to domestic and foreign creditors.  
The government’s optimal choice is endogenous to the status of the expectations of 
the private sector, which has two rather one, control variables. As in Obstfeld (1996), the 
private sector determines the credibility of the government’s commitment to EMU 
participation (credible versus non-credible commitment). Second, and in a way similar to the 
assumptions of Krugman’s (1998) model, the private sector determines whether the 
government’s fiscal liabilities are perceived as guaranteed or not guaranteed by the rest of the 
EMU members. The above give rise to three possible regimes for private expectations. In the 
first regime markets perceive the country’s EMU participation as fully credible and 
outstanding fiscal liabilities fully guaranteed. In that case, the loss of staying in the euro is 
given by L1: 
 
L1 = [γ1 (s* – s )]2    γ1≥ 0                 (1)  
 
 By allowing γ1 to take a zero value, Arghyrou and Tsoukalas account for the 
possibility that the interest rate on government bonds, capturing the cost of continued EMU 
participation, is de-linked from the present state of macro-fundamentals, in the same way 
assets’ prices are de-linked from their expected returns in Krugman’s (1998) model through 
government guarantees to the liabilities of financial institutions under lax financial 
supervision.7 The intuition underlying γ1 =0  is that with future EMU participation regarded 
as fully credible, markets fully expect the government to take all necessary action to correct 
                                                 
7 In Krugman’s (1998) model the perception of government guarantees transforms projects financed by financial 
institutions from fair bets to “heads-you-win-tails you-do-not-lose” bets. Under conditions of high international 
liquidity, investors switch their pricing model from one based on expected outcomes to one based on best-case 
outcomes. This results into bubbles in assets’ prices, rendering them vulnerable to sudden, abrupt drops when 
market expectations shift back to non-guaranteed financial liabilities status.  
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any macro-imbalances;8 and while it does so the risk of capital losses due to government 
default is zero, as a result of the perceived fiscal guarantees. Equation (1) also allows for 
another mechanism of macroeconomic correction, also consistent with fully credible EMU 
participation: By allowing γ1 to take values greater than zero, the model captures the possible 
existence of a market-discipline mechanism, where the private sector sends signals to the 
government, through the imposition of higher cost of servicing public debt, that 
macroeconomic correction is necessary, maintaining at the same time absolute certainty that 
the government will respond to this signal by taking all necessary corrective action.  
In the second regime markets continue to regard fiscal liabilities to be guaranteed as 
long the country remains in the EMU, but do not regard commitment to EMU participation as 
fully-credible. Rather, they perceive a non-zero probability that the government will choose 
to exit the EMU on its own, to avoid the welfare cost of macroeconomic correction necessary 
for long-term participation in the single currency.9 Assuming real overvaluation, the interest 
rate on government bonds now incorporates an exchange rate risk premium. In comparison to 
L1 the same value of real exchange rate q = (s* – s ) results into a higher loss value, giving 
rise to the loss function described by (2) below: 
 
L2 = [(γ1 +γ2) (s* – s )]2    γ1, γ2> 0                (2) 
 
Finally, in the third expectations’ regime markets regard commitment to the EMU as 
non-fully credible and do not perceive government liabilities to be guaranteed.10 In that case, 
the interest rate on government bonds incorporates not only an exchange rate premium but 
also a default premium. For every level of overvaluation the cost of continued EMU 
participation increases even further and is now given by:  
 
L3 = [(γ1 + γ2 +γ3 ) (s* – s )]2    γ1, γ2, γ3> 0                (3)  
 
                                                 
8 This is analogous to the smooth-pasting effect predicted by target-zone models of the exchange rate under 
conditions of full market credibility for the target zone.  
9 The possibility that markets perceive a positive probability of eventual EMU failure resulting into a re-
introduction of exchange rate risk had been considered since the early years of the eurozone’s existence (see e.g.  
Geyer et al., 2004).  The model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) implies that during the EMU sovereign debt 
crisis this probability and the premium associated with it have increased significantly.  
10 There is a fourth regime, where the private sector views future EMU participation as credible without fiscal 
guarantees of government bonds from EMU partners. In this case however the country’s commitment to EMU 
participation implies a strong incentive for sound fiscal finances. Therefore, Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) 
treat this case as isomorphic to the first regime, i.e. credible EMU participation and guaranteed fiscal liabilities. 
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Figure 1:  A model of EMU exit under shifting membership expectations and withdrawal of fiscal guarantees  
    C = Cost of EMU exit  
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EMU exit (C<L1, L2, L3) 
Second zone of multiple  
equilibria  
(C>L1, L2 and C<L3)  
Zone of unambiguous continued EMU 
participation (C>L1, L2, L3) 
L2 
L1 
L3 
Loss of staying in the EMU under non-
credible EMU membership and not 
guaranteed fiscal liabilities  
 
First zone of multiple  
equilibria 
(C>L1, C<L2,L3) 
Cost of policy choice: 
Staying vs. existing the EMU 
 
Loss of staying in the EMU under non-
credible EMU membership and 
guaranteed fiscal liabilities  
 
Loss of staying in the EMU under 
credible EMU membership and 
guaranteed fiscal liabilities  
 
 
 
 
         Real exchange rate q = (s* – s ) 
Under all expectations’ regimes the government chooses to stay in the EMU as long 
as the cost of continued EMU participation is lower than the cost of euro exit. For every 
expectations regime Arghyrou and Tsoukalas derive critical thresholds of overvaluation 
above which the government finds it optimal to leave the EMU. The value of these thresholds 
declines with negative shifts in expectations reducing the range of successful defence of 
EMU participation, as presented diagrammatically in Figure 1. Like Obstfeld (1996) the 
model predicts that shifts in expectations can result in self-fulfilling prophesies of EMU exit. 
However, the availability of two control variables for the private sector gives rise to two 
rather than one zone of multiple equilibria: The government might find it optimal to leave the 
EMU not only following an adverse shift of expectations regarding future EMU participation 
but also following a shift in perceptions regarding the availability of fiscal guarantees.  
 The analysis quoted above provides a number of testable hypotheses for explaining 
the movements of spreads of EMU government bonds against Germany since the euro’s 
launch in 1999. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas interpret the near-zero spread values observed 
between January 1999 to July 2007 as evidence of expectations of fully credible EMU 
commitment under the perception of fiscal guarantees. This resulted in de-linking macro-
fundamentals from interest rates on government bonds, i.e. EMU governments operated 
under L1 with γ1 = 0 or γ1 taking values very close to zero.  During that period the increasingly 
deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals of periphery EMU countries (see section 4 
below) were not penalised with higher interest rates on government bonds, as markets, 
endowed with ample global liquidity, continued to discount full real convergence of 
periphery EMU economies to the core ones.11  
Arghyrou and Tsoukalas propose that following the onset of the global credit crunch 
in August 2007 and the resulting significant capital losses sustained on corporate portfolios, 
markets started pricing sovereign bonds on a country-by-country basis based on 
macroeconomic performance. Initially, they continued to regard all countries’ participation to 
the EMU as fully credible, still pricing bonds under L1 but now setting γ1 > 0. This explains 
the differences in spreads observed since August 2007, reflecting different degrees of real 
exchange rate overvaluation, caused by different degrees of competitiveness losses and fiscal 
imbalances. The subsequent escalation of the Greek debt crisis is attributed to a double shift 
in expectations, from a regime of fully credible EMU commitment under guaranteed fiscal 
liabilities to a regime of non-credible EMU commitment and non-guaranteed fiscal liabilities. 
                                                 
11 See Adalid and Detken (2007) and Belke et al. (2010), among others, for empirical analyses that identify a 
link between global liquidity and financial asset prices. 
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This double expectations’ shift moved Greece from L1 to L3, explaining the sudden, 
pronounced increase in Greek spreads without any significant news on Greek fundamentals.12  
The data suggests that this shift has taken place in a two-step fashion, initially from L1 
to L2 and then from L2 to L3. The first shift occurred in mid-November 2009, with the Greek 
spread subsequently increasing from 130 basis points to 240 basis points by the end of the 
year. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas explain this shift as the result of the too cautious, under the 
circumstances, nature of the proposed 2010 budget submitted by the Greek authorities to the 
European Commission. The limited only envisaged progress in terms of promoting long 
overdue fiscal reform resulted into public critical comments on behalf of top EU officials 
(including the president of the ECB) and, according to Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) 
validated fears that Greece was not determined to address its long-standing structural 
problems necessary for long-term EMU participation. This view is also supported by Lynn 
(2011) who reports intense market scepticism regarding the credibility of the proposed Greek 
plan in achieving the necessary fiscal correction in the wake of its announcement. On the 
basis of the above, Arghyrou and Tsoukalas argue that the submission of the proposed 2010 
budget was an event that operated as the catalyst for the shift in market expectations from 
credible to non-credible EMU participation, introducing a previously non-existent exchange 
rate risk causing Greece to shift from L1 to L2.  
An alternative view is that this shift was caused by the introduction of default risk, 
particularly following the downgrading of Greek sovereign bonds from various credit rating 
agencies in early December 2009. Distinguishing between the two types of risk, exchange-
rate versus default, is not a straightforward task especially since the two are very likely to 
reinforce each other (a country thought as more likely to default will be seen as more likely to 
leave the EMU and vice-versa).  There exists substantial survey evidence13 as well as 
statements by influential market analysts (see e.g. Lynn, 2011, p. 133) suggesting that in the 
aftermath of the outbreak of the Greek debt crisis markets perceived a non-negligible 
exchange rate risk associated with investments in Greek sovereign bonds. On the other hand, 
the significant increase in the Greek CDS spread over the same period also suggests the 
                                                 
12 On 13 October 2009 Greece announced a revision of its projected 2009 public deficit from 6% of GDP to 
13.7% of GDP. However, the Greek spread did not react to this news, as markets seem to have fully anticipated 
the substantial worsening of the Greek fiscal position well before it was announced. The Greek spread started its 
steep ascend in mid-November 2009, following the submission by Greek authorities of the Greek proposed 2010 
public budget to the European Commission (see below).  
13 See, for example, the articles titled “Confidence in the euro still low”, published by The Financial Times 
Advisor on September 20, 2010, and “Economists’ survey of the UK: will the euro survive with its current 
membership for the next five years?” published by The Telegraph, on 9 June 2010.  
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introduction of significant default risk (see also our analysis in section 5.3 below). Overall, it 
is very likely that the shift from L1 to L2 in November 2009 was the result of both exchange-
rate and default risk.  
The second shift from L2 to L3 occurred in the first quarter of 2010, when the Greek 
spread increasing from 240 basis points at the end of 2009 to nearly 700 basis points in late 
April 2010. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas explain this shift as the result of intra-EMU 
disagreements regarding the necessity and extent of a Greek bail-out. They argue that these 
disagreements were interpreted by markets as withdrawal of the previously perceived fiscal 
guarantees, resulting into the introduction of significant default risk or, if this already existed 
since November 2009, its substantial increase.14 By applying to all EMU members, the 
withdrawal of the perceived fiscal guarantee spread the Greek debt crisis to other EMU 
periphery countries, which have also sustained significant competitiveness losses over the 
period 1999-2007.  
If the model summarized above were correct, an econometric investigation of the 
movements of EMU spreads over the period 1999-2010 should produce the following 
findings: First, prior to the credit crunch crisis, i.e. during January 1999-July 2007, the real 
exchange rate, a variable used in our analysis as a measure of overall macroeconomic 
performance, should not be statistically significant in explaining spreads’ movements. 
Second, following the onset of the global credit crunch crisis in July 2007, the real exchange 
rate should be significant in explaining spread movements, i.e. real appreciation should cause 
higher spread values. Finally, and to capture the assumed contagion effect, during the crisis 
period the Greek spread should be significant in explaining spreads in other EMU countries, 
even when real appreciation and the effect of the global risk aversion has been accounted for. 
All the above constitute testable hypotheses, which we address immediately below. 
 
4.  Data description 
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the monthly 10-year government 
bond yield spread relative to Germany for ten euro-area countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We exclude Luxembourg, 
                                                 
14 In May 2010 Greece was eventually given a bail-out rescue loan package of 110 billion euros, financed by the 
EU, the ECB and the IMF. Later that month the EU announced a European stabilisation mechanism, making 
available a total of up to approximately 750 billion euros to EMU countries funder market pressure over the next 
three years. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) argue that EMU spreads failed to respond to these measures, as 
they were taken too late and were not enough to reverse the adverse shift in expectations caused by the original 
handling of the crisis.  
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where the outstanding government debt and the associated market are very small, as well as 
the countries that joined the euro since 2008 (Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia). The 
yield spreads sample covers the period 1999.01-2010.04. The data sources for bond yields are 
Bloomberg (1999.01-2000.12) and the European Central Bank (2001.01-2010.04).15 
Figure 2 plots the 10-year euro-area government bond yield spreads. Four important 
stylised facts should be noted. First, before the credit crisis (1999-mid 2007) spreads against 
Germany had stabilised at very low levels despite deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals 
in many countries.16  
 
Figure 2: 10-year government bond yield spreads 
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Note: Spreads are calculated versus Germany and are expressed in basis points. The shaded area corresponds to 
the period 2007.08-2009.08. 
 
As Table 1 shows, during the pre-crisis period, the average spread ranged from 8.4 basis 
points in France to 53.5 basis points in Greece, with most countries exhibiting spreads of less 
than 20 basis points. Figure 3 plots the (log) real effective exchange rate of the euro-area 
economies and shows that the real exchange rate appreciation that commenced in 2001 
persists after 2004 in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain reflecting lower international 
                                                 
15 The ECB interest rate data is available at:  http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html. 
16 The onset of the crisis is generally accepted to be late July 2007. On 9 August 2007, the European Central 
Bank made the first large emergency loan to banks in response to increasing pressures in the interbank market. 
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competitiveness.17 On the other hand, in Germany the trend from 2004 onwards is relatively 
flat. 
 
Table 1: Average 10-year government bond yield spreads 
 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
Full sample 22.3 25.4 17.8 13.8 76.4 36.4 39.4 13.8 34.1 23.6 
Pre-crisis 14.4 17.8 12.6 8.4 53.5 11.6 26.2 8.6 20.9 14.2 
Crisis 46.8 49.2 34.3 30.4 147.9 113.8 80.5 30.2 75.2 52.8 
Crisis-contagion 45.1 48.5 28.1 32.9 257.4 160.1 86.5 27.1 98.8 68.4 
Note: Spreads are expressed in basis points. The full sample period is 1999.01-2010.04. The pre-crisis period is 
1999.01-2007.07. The crisis period is 2007.08-2010.04. The crisis-contagion period is 2009.09-2010.04. 
 
This divergence in external competitiveness within the euro-area is also reflected in 
Figure 4 which plots the current account balance as percentage of GDP. The data in 
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands is characterised by an overall positive trend, indicating 
the current account is improving over time. However, in the rest of the euro-area countries 
the current account is generally deteriorating over time. The deterioration has been 
particularly pronounced in Greece, Portugal and Spain where the current account deficit takes 
increasingly high values throughout the entire sample period, signifying the presence of 
important internal imbalances within the euro-area.18  
 Second, during the credit crisis all euro-area economies experienced a large increase 
in their spread versus Germany. As Table 1 indicates, since August 2007, average spreads 
increased by a factor of around three or four, on average, in most countries and by a factor of 
ten in Ireland. German government bonds operated as a ‘flight-to-quality’ asset during the 
crisis putting an upward pressure in all euro-area government bond yield spreads. This 
‘flight-to-quality’ feature of German bonds is apparent in Figure 5, which plots the 10-year 
German yield together with a general indicator of common international risk, the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX). 
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17 Between January 2001 and February 2010, the real effective exchange rate appreciated by 22, 18, 15 and 10 
percent in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal, respectively. Becker (2009, p.4) stresses that developments in a 
country’s external competitiveness “can be summarized in one single number: the real effective (i.e. trade-
weighted) exchange rate”.  
18 The real effective exchange rate, current account balance and GDP series were obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics dataset. The real effective exchange rate is defined so that an 
increase describes a real appreciation.   
Figure 3: Log real effective exchange rate  
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Note: The real effective exchange rate is calculated using consumer price indices. An increase indicates a real 
appreciation.  
 
Figure 4: Current account balance as percentage of GDP 
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Figure 5: German 10-year government bond yield and VIX 
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Note: The shaded area corresponds to the period 2007.08-2009.08. 
 
The VIX is a measure of US implied stock market volatility obtained via 
Bloomberg.19 Towards the end of 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
credit crisis reached its peak. During that period of market turmoil, the VIX increased 
sharply, while the 10-year German government bond yield moved in the opposite direction 
indicating that in an environment of heightened uncertainty, investors flock to the perceived 
safety of German bonds. 
                                                
Figures 6 and 7 depict the transformation of the credit crisis into a sovereign debt 
crisis with euro-area government budget balances deteriorating sharply and government debt 
as a proportion of GDP increasing significantly since mid-2008.20 The fiscal deterioration 
reflects lower tax revenues for the euro-area governments, due to economic contraction, as 
well the fiscal stimulus packages that were implemented to prevent further contraction.  
 
 
19 The VIX is constructed using call- and put-implied volatilities from the S&P 500 index 30-day options. 
Implied volatility measures are forward-looking, as opposed to historical volatility measures which are 
backward-looking. An index value of e.g. 20 for the VIX indicates that the implied volatility of 30-day options 
on the S&P 500 is 20 percent.  Note that prior to 22 September 2003, the S&P 100 index was used for the 
calculation of the VIX. Monthly averages of the VIX are calculated from daily observations. Econometric 
analysis using regime-switching models in IMF (2003) suggests that ‘flight-to-quality’ periods and high levels 
of the VIX tend to coincide. 
20 The general government lending/borrowing and gross government debt series were obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics dataset.   
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Figure 6: General government net lending or borrowing as percentage of GDP 
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Note: The shaded area corresponds to the period 2007.Q3-2009.Q4. 
 
 
Figure 7: Gross government debt as percentage of GDP 
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Furthermore, governments faced the additional major fiscal cost of having to support the 
financial sector, via significant capital injections in the euro-area banks’ balance sheets, 
guarantees, such as the Irish government bank guarantee scheme (29/09/2008), and outright 
purchases of assets from banks.21 
Third, despite reductions in the second half of 2008, no country has returned to its 
pre-crisis spread level. Finally, and very importantly, there is initial evidence of contagion 
from the Greek debt crisis to other EMU members. In particular, the average spread in 
Greece increased significantly since September 2009, at 257.4 basis points, marking the 
Greek debt crisis. During the latter part of the sample, average spreads increased also in the 
other Club-Med countries (Italy, Portugal and Spain) as well as in Ireland, indicating the 
possibility of contagion from Greece. This conjecture is explicitly tested by our econometric 
analysis below.  
In our benchmark pre-crisis econometric specification, spreads are modelled on their 
lagged level, the log of the real effective exchange rate and the VIX. This specification maps 
directly our empirical analysis to the theoretical model presented in section 3, also controlling 
for the effects of momentum trading and international risk aversion. The VIX, often called 
the ‘investor fear gauge’ since it tends to spike during market turmoil periods (Whaley, 
2000), is a reasonable proxy for global financial instability (Mody, 2009). Other studies that 
employ the VIX as an aggregate risk proxy in analyses of euro-area government bond yield 
spreads include Beber et al. (2009) and Gerlach et al. (2010). Furthermore, we estimate 
alternative, extended specifications where the set of explanatory variables for spreads also 
includes a measure of bond market liquidity, industrial production growth and the expected 
fiscal position, as suggested by expected public debt and budget balance to GDP ratios. All 
aforementioned variables are calculated as differentials versus Germany. 
 Bond market liquidity is measured by the size of government bond market as in 
Bernoth et al. (2004), Gomez-Puig (2006), Haugh et al. (2009) and Attinasi et al. (2009) 
among others. In particular, we use the ratio of a country’s outstanding general government 
debt to euro-area-wide total.22 As Table 2 shows, Italy, Germany and France have the largest 
government bond markets in the euro-area, while the three smallest markets are those of 
                                                 
21 Sgherri and Zoli (2009) argue that the discretionary euro-area fiscal stimulus is estimated to around 1.1 and 
0.9 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2010, respectively. They also point out that the immediate euro-area fiscal cost 
of the banks’ support measures is, on average, around 3.5 percent of (2008) GDP. 
22 The data on outstanding amounts of general government long-term securities other than shares is obtained 
from the ECB’s Securities Issues Statistics:  http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=17102. 
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Ireland, Finland and Portugal. We use the annual growth rate of industrial production as a 
proxy for the state of business cycle. 23 As Alesina et al. (1992) point out, sovereign debt 
becomes riskier during periods of economic slowdown (see also Bernoth et al., 2004). Table 
2 indicates that prior to the crisis Ireland exhibited the highest growth rate while Portugal 
underperformed exhibiting negative average growth. During the crisis, industrial production 
declined in all euro-area members, with Spain and Italy being particularly affected.  
Moving on to frequently used measures of credit risk, we obtained data on the expected fiscal 
position of the euro-area economies from the European Commission’s Economic Forecasts 
Database.24 The expected fiscal position provides a proxy for credit quality, with an expected 
fiscal deterioration implying higher risk. We use the one-year-ahead expected balance, that is, 
net lending or borrowing (as percentage of the GDP) and the one-year-ahead expected gross 
debt of the general government (as percentage of the GDP). The utilisation of expected, as 
opposed to historical fiscal data, is in line with a number of recent studies including Attinasi 
et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009) and Gerlach et al. (2010). The descriptive statistics in 
Table 2 indicate that only during the last months of the crisis subsample period expectations 
appear to shift sharply towards fiscal deterioration. For example, in Greece, the latest figures 
from the European Commission’s Economic Forecasts (Spring 2010) indicate that debt is 
expected to rise to almost 134% of the GDP by 2011, signifying an enormous fiscal strain. 
Finally, we obtained data from Bloomberg on the CDS spreads for the euro-area 10-year 
government bonds. The CDS is a credit derivative which allows the buyer to purchase 
insurance against the risk of default.25 The CDS market for developed country sovereign debt 
is relatively new but has experienced significant growth over the last years.26 Nevertheless, 
according to the BIS (2010), the amount of sovereign risk which is reallocated through CDS  
                                                 
23 The industrial production series were obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics dataset.   
24 These forecasts are produced by the DG ECFIN twice a year (spring and autumn). They result from analyses 
made by the DG ECFIN’s country-desks, as opposed to a centralised econometric model. The data is available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/forecasts_en.htm. As Attinasi et al. 
(2009) point out, given the prominent role of the European Commission’s forecasts, investors may use them a 
source of information to form their expectations. 
25 The buyer of a CDS contract on sovereign bonds agrees to make regular payments (CDS premium) to the 
seller in return for a payment by the seller if the credit event (default of the reference entity) occurs. The CDS 
spread is equal to the total amount that the buyer pays per year divided by the total face value of the bonds 
(notional principal). The payment that the buyer receives if the credit event occurs is equal to the notional 
principal multiplied by: (1- recovery rate); where the recovery rate is equal to the ratio of the post-default value 
of the bond to its face value. For example, the recovery rate for CDS contracts with Lehman Brothers as the 
reference entity was only about 8% (see Hull, 2009, Chapter 23).  
26 10-year CDS data for Greek, French, Italian and Spanish contracts commence on 01/12/2003 in Bloomberg. 
However, German data commences on 15/03/2004 and hence this is the earliest starting point for the calculation 
of CDS spreads relative to Germany. Data for Austria, Belgium, Finland and Portugal commence on 
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Table 2: Bond market size, industrial production growth and expected fiscal position 
Full sample 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
Bond Mkt Size 3.3 5.9 1.4 19.2 23.7 3.8 0.8 28.1 4.7 1.6 7.5 
Ind. Prod.  2.7 -0.1 0.9 -0.9 0.5 -0.2 4.4 -1.7 0.8 -1.6 -1.2 
Exp. Budg. Bal. -1.6 -0.9 2.5 -3.0 -2.3 -2.5 -1.1 -2.8 -1.1 -3.3 -1.0 
Exp. Debt 63.0 96.3 40.2 64.3 64.7 101.6 36.3 107.3 53.5 63.2 49.9 
Pre-crisis 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
Bond Mkt Size 3.3 6.1 1.5 18.9 23.4 3.4 0.7 28.6 4.8 1.6 7.6 
Ind. Prod.  4.7 2.0 4.0 0.6 2.8 1.1 6.3 0.7 1.5 -0.3 1.6 
Exp. Budg. Bal. -1.2 -0.3 3.0 -2.4 -2.3 -1.8 1.0 -2.5 -0.9 -2.9 0.0 
Exp. Debt 62.7 98.4 41.1 61.5 63.5 101.5 31.6 106.9 54.0 60.3 50.5 
Crisis 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
Bond Mkt Size 3.2 5.2 1.0 20.3 24.3 5.1 1.0 26.4 4.2 1.8 7.4 
Ind. Prod.  -3.6 -6.4 -8.2 -5.7 -6.7 -4.3 -1.3 -9.0 -1.3 -5.4 -9.9 
Exp. Budg. Bal. -2.6 -2.8 1.0 -4.8 -2.2 -4.8 -7.4 -3.4 -1.9 -4.6 -4.1 
Exp. Debt 64.2 89.8 37.4 72.9 68.7 102.0 50.8 108.5 52.1 72.3 47.8 
Crisis-contagion 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
Bond Mkt Size 3.1 5.2 1.0 20.0 23.4 5.4 1.4 26.2 4.2 1.8 8.3 
Ind. Prod.  -6.2 -11.1 -15.1 -4.2 -8.6 -7.7 -4.0 -9.0 -1.3 -3.0 -7.0 
Exp. Budg. Bal. -5.4 -5.7 -4.1 -8.0 -5.1 -11.1 -14.5 -5.2 -6.0 -7.8 -9.9 
Exp. Debt 73.9 101.1 48.1 83.7 77.6 123.9 83.1 116.9 65.8 85.0 66.6 
 
Note: All the data in Table 2 is expressed in percentages. The full sample period for the bond market size and 
expected fiscal position variables is 1999.01-2010.04, while for the industrial production growth the full sample 
period is 2000.01-2010.01. The pre-crisis period extends from the start of the sample until 2007.07, while the 
crisis period extends from 2007.08 until the end of the sample. The crisis-contagion period extends from 
2009.09 until the end of the sample.  
 
markets is not as large as the gross outstanding volumes would imply since net CDS positions 
as proportion of the outstanding sovereign debt are only close to 5% in Portugal and even less 
in Greece, Ireland and Spain.27 CDS spreads have been used by Barrios et al. (2009) and 
Beber et al. (2009) as a proxy for credit risk in high-frequency empirical investigations of 
eurozone spreads (weekly and intraday, respectively), where expected fiscal position 
                                                                                                                                                        
05/04/2004, while in Ireland and Netherlands the CDS contracts become available towards the end of the sample 
period, on 29/01/2009 and 23/01/2008, respectively. 
27 The BIS (2010) suggests that sovereign reallocated risk is better captured by net CDS positions since a large 
proportion of trades reflect offsetting transactions as CDS market participants frequently do not terminate or 
replace the former contracts. This feature of the CDS market generates a chain of linked exposures with market 
participants having limited information about the parties beyond their direct counterparties (see ECB, 2009). 
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measures are not available. Figure 8 plots the 10-year government bond yield spreads 
together with the corresponding CDS spreads. It appears that in most euro-area economies the 
two series tend to broadly co-move over time, especially during the credit/debt crisis. Sharp 
increases in CDS spreads are observed in Greece, Portugal and Spain since autumn 2009, 
with the cost of insuring against default reaching a historical high by the end of April 2010. 
 
5.   Empirical framework and results  
 This section presents our estimated econometric models and empirical results. 
Subsection 5.1 contains the findings from the pre-crisis period (1999.01-2007.07). Subsection 
5.2 refers to the crisis period (2007.08-2010.04). Subsection 5.3 focuses on the Greek debt 
crisis; and subsection 5.4 on robustness tests.  
  
5.1 Modelling spreads during the pre-crisis period 
 The baseline model for spreads prior to the crisis relates them to country-specific 
macroeconomic fundamentals, captured by the value of the real exchange rate, and the 
international risk factor, accounting at the same time for persistence in the data. The model is 
given by Eq. (4) below: 
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t t1 1 2 3t t tspread a spread q vix uβ β β−= + + + +       (4) 
 
where spreadt denotes the 10-year government bond yield spread relative to Germany, qt is 
the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate, vixt denotes the logarithm of the CBOE 
Volatility Index and ut is a white noise error term.  
 Table 3 - A presents the time-series estimates of the baseline model correcting for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form in the residuals (OLS-HAC; see 
Newey and West, 1987). Spreads are quite persistent as indicated by the estimates of the 
autoregressive parameter (β1) which range from 0.74 in Netherlands to 0.96 in Austria and 
are significantly different from zero at the 1% level in all cases. Beyond autoregressive 
dynamics however, spreads either do not react or exhibit the wrong sign in their reaction to  
Figure 8: Credit Default Swap spreads and 10-year government bonds yields spreads 
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Note: Spreads are calculated versus Germany and are expressed in basis points in the case of the 10-year bond yields and thousands of US dollars (USD) in the case of the Credit 
Default Swaps (cost of insuring 10,000,000 USD holdings of government debt against default).  
 
Table 3  
 
A: Pre-crisis time-series estimates, OLS-HAC, baseline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
spreadt-1 0.96 *** 0.91 *** 0.87 *** 0.81 *** 0.91 *** 0.78 *** 0.84 *** 0.74 *** 0.90 *** 0.91 *** 
qt -0.01 -0.20 -0.21 ** -0.08 -0.04 -0.20 ** -0.21 * -0.23 *** -0.29 -0.19  
vixt 0.01 0.00 0.02 * 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
           
Adj-R2 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.83 0.94 0.94 0.86 0.88 0.94 0.96 
 
B: Pre-crisis time-series estimates, OLS-HAC, controlling for liquidity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
spreadt-1 0.93 *** 0.90 *** 0.81 *** 0.81 *** 0.91 *** 0.78 *** 0.84*** 0.71 *** 0.90 *** 0.93 *** 
qt 0.17 0.17  -0.13 -0.05 0.21 -0.23 ** -0.30 -0.19 ** -0.38 * -0.31 ** 
vixt -0.003 -0.001 0.01 0.01 * -0.004 0.01 -0.001 0.006 -0.007 -0.002 
liqt 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.006 0.02 -0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.006 -0.008 
           
Adj-R2 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.83 0.94 0.93 0.86 0.88 0.94 0.96 
 
 C: Pre-crisis time-series estimates, OLS-HAC, controlling for liquidity and output growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
spreadt-1 0.92 *** 0.91 *** 0.81 *** 0.75 *** 0.86 *** 0.82 *** 0.84 *** 0.72 *** 0.91 *** 0.88 *** 
qt 0.10 -0.23 0.19  -0.14  0.09 -0.21 ** -0.31 -0.22 ** -0.31  -0.41 *** 
vixt -0.005 -0.001 0.01  0.01 -0.001 0.01  -0.001 0.006 -0.01 -0.002 
liqt 0.01 -0.001 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.007 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 -0.007 
gindt 0.01 0.00 0.001 * 0.00 -0.002 * 0.00 -0.001 0.00 0.0001 -0.002 
           
Adj-R2 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.82 0.94 0.95 0.86 0.88 0.94 0.96 
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D: Pre-crisis time-series estimates, OLS-HAC, controlling for liquidity and expected fiscal position 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
spreadt-1 0.82 *** 0.82 *** 0.77 *** 0.80 *** 0.79 *** 0.79 *** 0.79 *** 0.65 *** 0.82 *** 0.83 *** 
qt 0.07 0.25 -0.16 -0.11 -0.41 -0.22 ** -0.35 * -0.35 *** -0.51 *** -0.27 
vixt -0.004 -0.004 0.02 * 0.01 * 0.01 0.02 0.007 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 
liqt 0.02 0.002 0.002 *** 0.01 0.01 -0.003 0.002 0.008 0.01 0.005 
balt -0.01 ** -0.01 * -0.01 *** -0.003 -0.01 * 0.001 -0.01 * -0.01 *** -0.01 ** -0.01 ** 
debtt 0.00 0.00 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 * 0.00 -0.002 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 
           
Adj-R2 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.83 0.94 0.93 0.86 0.89 0.94 0.96 
  
Note: In Table 5 - A, B and D, the regression models are estimated over the time period 1999.01-2007.07 in all cases apart from Greece where the 
sample period is 2001.01-2007.07, due the later entrance of Greece into the EMU. In Table 5 - C the regression models are estimated over the time 
period 2000.01-2007.07 in all cases apart from Greece (2001.01-2007.07). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the parameters with 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) consistent estimates of the standard errors are shown. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the international and country-specific explanatory variables. Specifically, the VIX is not 
significant at the 5% level of significance as determinant of spreads in any country, thereby 
suggesting that the link between spreads and global financial risk was not active during the 
pre-crisis period. Furthermore, there is evidence of non-pricing, as well as mispricing in 
certain instances, of the country-specific macroeconomic fundamental since the real effective 
exchange rate coefficient is either statistically insignificant or negative and significant. This 
indicates that during the pre-crisis period real exchange rate appreciation and the associated 
loss of competitiveness were not penalised by bond market participants in the form of higher 
spreads. This finding is robust to controlling for contemporaneous correlation in the error 
terms across the equations reflecting, for example, common aggregate shocks.28  
 Table 3 - B reports the OLS-HAC time-series estimates of the parameters of the 
baseline model augmented by the proxy for bond market liquidity (liqt). In all cases, the 
coefficient of liqt is not significantly different from zero, indicating that spreads were not 
affected by bond market liquidity risk considerations during the pre-crisis period. Similar 
evidence, in terms of the limited explanatory power of country-specific factors as 
determinants of spreads, is provided by Table 3 - C. This table shows the results from 
regressions where, in addition to the bond market liquidity proxy, a proxy for the state of 
business cycle (output growth differentials, gindt) is included in the baseline model. At the 
5% level of significance, both additional variables are statistically insignificant. It is only 
when the expected fiscal position variables (expected budget balance, i.e. net 
lending/borrowing differentials, balt; and expected gross debt differentials, debtt) are 
incorporated in the baseline model, that we obtain some evidence supporting the role of a 
country-specific factor with the theoretically expected sign. As we can see in Table 3 - D, an 
improvement in the fiscal position captured by an increase in the value of the government’s 
balance balt (i.e. a movement away from net borrowing towards net lending) leads to lower 
spreads in the majority of countries, with the coefficient of balt being negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% or less in eight cases. On the other hand, the evidence does 
                                                 
28 The average cross-country correlation coefficient in the residuals of Eq. (4) is equal to 0.43. In order to 
empirically account for this correlation, we form a system of equations, representing the baseline model in each 
country, and estimate it with the seemingly unrelated regression method (SUR). SUR estimates of the system’s 
parameters account for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations. The 
pre-crisis estimates are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. In line with the OLS-HAC time-series estimates in 
Table 3 - A, SUR estimates of the real exchange rate coefficient are either statistically insignificant or 
statistically significant with a negative sign. Using SUR, there is more evidence, as compared to the robust OLS 
estimates, of the degree of financial market volatility being a determinant of spreads, since the VIX coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant in some countries. See also Barrios et al. (2009) for evidence from weekly 
data supporting the view that the degree of risk aversion affected the euro-area government bond yield spreads 
during the pre-crisis period (2003-2009), while country-specific factors did not exert much influence. 
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not support the existence of a strong link between spreads and expected debt during the pre-
crisis period. Hence, the credit risk channel appears to mainly operate via the expected fiscal 
balance, as opposed to expected debt. 
 Table 4 reports panel estimates of the baseline model and its extensions: 
 
'
1 1 2 3it i it it t it itspread a spread q vix uβ β β−= + + + + +ΘX     (5) 
 
where '1[ ...it it jit ]x x=X , and   denote the vector of additional 
explanatory variables and the relevant coefficient vector, respectively. 
'
1[ ... ]jθ=Θ θ
  
Table 4: Pre-crisis panel estimates, fixed effects 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
spreadit-1 0.90 *** 0.89 *** 0.89 *** 0.86 *** 
qit -0.08 ** -0.06 -0.06 -0.13 *** 
vixt 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.002 
liqit - 0.21 * 0.21 * 0.36 ** 
gindit - - 0.00 0.00 
balit - - - -0.005 *** 
debtit - - - 0.00 
     
Test for FE 0.01 0.006 0.006 0.00 
Adj-R2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Note: Specification (1) corresponds to the baseline model during the pre-crisis period. Specification (2) 
augments the baseline model by the liquidity measure. Specifications (3) and (4) add output growth differentials 
and the expected fiscal position variables. The regression models are estimated over the time period 2001.01-
2007.07. The panel members include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. Fixed effects panel estimates with GLS cross-section weights in order to account for cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity are shown. Test for Fixed Effects (FE) shows the p-value for the null hypothesis of 
redundant fixed effects. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Eq. (5) represents a fixed-effects panel data model and is estimated using Generalised 
Least Squares (GLS)-based cross-section weights which account for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity.  The null hypothesis of redundant fixed effects is strongly rejected both 
for baseline and the three alternative models. The pre-crisis results from panel estimation of 
the baseline model (see column 2 in Table 4) are similar to those from time-series estimation 
as spreads are found to be quite persistent, the real effective exchange link remains either 
statistically insignificant or significant with the wrong (negative) sign, while global financial 
market volatility does not have any explanatory power over spreads. Similarly, panel 
 28
estimation results of the extended models (see specifications 2, 3 and 4 in Table 4) are also in 
line with the previously presented time-series estimates since output growth and expected 
debt differentials are statistically insignificant, while the expected fiscal balance is a 
significant determinant of spreads. The main difference between pre-crisis time-series and 
panel estimates is that within the latter bond market liquidity conditions become statistically 
significant but not with the theoretically expected negative sign, thereby indicating 
mispricing of liquidity risk. 29 
 Thus, overall, the pre-crisis results can be viewed as being supportive of the 
‘convergence trade’ conjecture, according to which investors “…bought the bonds of 
peripheral European governments in the hope that their yields would convergence with those 
of Germany” (The Economist, 12/06/2010). In terms of the theoretical model presented in 
section 3, these findings offer support to the hypothesis that prior to the global credit crunch, 
spreads were de-linked from macro-fundamentals, as markets discounted full convergence 
between core and periphery EMU countries, i.e. a state of the world with EMU countries 
operating under L1 with γ1= 0. The resulting high demand for the bonds of periphery countries 
exerted a downward pressure on their spreads and the expectation of convergence, which lay 
at the heart of this trading strategy, became self-fulfilling leading to profits for bond market 
investors and lower borrowing costs for the governments. It appears that markets were 
myopically discounting, in a way similar to the predictions of Krugman’s (1998) model  for 
asset prices, only the best-case scenario of full convergence to German fundamentals and 
failed to react to deteriorating domestic fundamentals as indicated by falling competitiveness. 
Consequently, ‘convergence trade’, along with the absence of an effective EU-sponsored 
mechanism of economic monitoring imposing reform, relaxed considerably the degree of 
pressure on many governments to improve fundamentals. This contributed to increasing real 
divergence within the eurozone and put in place the necessary background for the 
developments taking place during the crisis period.  
 
5.2 Modelling spreads during the crisis period 
 The Greek spread variable is added to the baseline model for the spreads of the other 
eurozone members during the turmoil period allowing us to explicitly test the hypothesis of 
euro-area contagion from the Greek debt crisis: 
                                                 
29 A negative sign is theoretically expected since improvements in the liquidity of the market for government 
bonds should lead to lower spreads as the liquidity premium declines.  
 29
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t t
                                                
GR
1 1 2 3 4t t t tspread a spread q vix spread vβ β β β−= + + + + +     (6) 
 
where spreadtGR denotes the 10-year Greek government bond yield spread relative to 
Germany, vt is a white noise error term and all other variables are as previously defined.  
 Table 5 - A presents the OLS-HAC time-series estimates of Eq. (6). The crisis results 
are strikingly different in comparison to the pre-crisis results as international and country-
specific explanatory variables are now strongly significant in most cases. More specifically, 
first, the persistence of spreads is considerably lower during the crisis with the estimates of 
the autoregressive parameter ranging from 0.34 in Portugal to 0.75 in Ireland. Second, the 
link between spreads and global financial risk becomes strongly active since August 2007, as 
indicated by the statistical significance of the VIX in all countries. The Italian spread exhibits 
the greatest degree of exposure to the global risk factor, followed by Austrian and Irish 
spreads. Third, the real exchange rate coefficient is positive and statistically significant in 
most countries. Hence, in contrast to the pre-crisis period, where there was either non-pricing 
or mispricing of the risk associated with competitiveness losses and other adverse macro-
developments, during the crisis this country-specific macroeconomic risk is reflected in the 
spreads. Fourth, contagion from the Greek debt crisis appears to have taken place almost 
everywhere since the coefficient associated with the Greek spread variable is positive and 
significant in most countries. The degree of contagion is not uniform ranging from a low 
level of contagion in France to high levels in Portugal, Ireland and Spain. The high degree of 
exposure of Portugal, Ireland and Spain to the Greek debt crisis does not come as a surprise 
given that, like Greece, since the euro’s introduction in 1999 these countries have all 
experienced significant deterioration in their fundamentals.30 These findings are robust to 
accounting for contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations.31  
 In Table 5 - B and C we report the results from augmenting the baseline model by the 
bond market liquidity and business cycle conditions proxies. In Table 5 - B, the estimated 
coefficient of the liquidity measure is negative and statistically significant in Austria, 
Belgium, Finland and Portugal, indicating that liquidity risk is priced in the spreads of these  
 
30 As Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010, p.18) point out, “These include competitiveness losses leading to 
substantial current account deficits, particularly in the cases of Portugal and Spain (see also Arghyrou and 
Chortareas, 2009); and…a major fiscal deterioration in 2008-2009”. 
31 See SUR estimates of the baseline model during the crisis in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Table 5  
 
A: Crisis time-series estimates, OLS-HAC, baseline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
spreadt-1 0.52 *** 0.49 *** 0.59 *** 0.50 *** 0.75 *** 0.44 *** 0.60 *** 0.34 *** 0.36 *** 
qt 4.88 *** 1.66 *** 2.29 *** 1.69 ** 1.63 4.28 *** 2.01 ** 4.36 * 2.74 *** 
vixt 0.31 *** 0.26 *** 0.23 *** 0.16 *** 0.30 *** 0.43 *** 0.22 *** 0.19 ** 0.21 *** 
spreadtGR 0.09 *** 0.07 *** 0.02 0.05 ** 0.22 ** 0.11 *** 0.01 0.27 *** 0.17 *** 
          
Adj-R2 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.96 
 
 
B: Crisis time-series estimates, OLS-HAC, controlling for liquidity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
spreadt-1 0.55 *** 0.49 *** 0.59 *** 0.50 ** 0.73 *** 0.45 *** 0.58 *** 0.38 *** 0.36 *** 
qt 5.18 ** 1.88 *** 2.65 *** 1.69 ** 1.79 * 4.51 *** 2.73 ** 3.73 2.74 *** 
vixt 0.27 *** 0.22 *** 0.19 *** 0.16 *** 0.33 ** 0.42 *** 0.20 *** 0.11  0.20 *** 
liqt -0.05 ** -0.05 * -0.05 * 0.00 0.03 -0.03  -0.05 -0.08 ** -0.004 
spreadtGR 0.12 *** 0.10 *** 0.04 ** 0.05 *** 0.21 ** 0.12 *** 0.04 0.32 *** 0.17 *** 
          
Adj-R2 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.96 
 31 
 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C: Crisis time-series estimates, OLS-HAC, controlling for liquidity and output growth 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
spreadt-1 0.49 *** 0.41 *** 0.56 *** 0.43 *** 0.49 ***  0.43 *** 0.58 *** 0.36 * 0.28 ** 
qt 3.77 *** 1.75 *** 2.56 *** 1.72 ** 1.53 * 4.44 *** 2.58 * 5.17 ** 2.68 *** 
vixt 0.21 *** 0.21 *** 0.19 *** 0.16 *** 0.27 * 0.42 *** 0.20 *** 0.16 * 0.20 *** 
liqt -0.06 *** -0.06 * -0.06 ** -0.01 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01  
gindt 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.01 ** 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.003 
spreadtGR 0.14 *** 0.12 ** 0.06 ** 0.05 0.31 *** 0.13 *** 0.04 0.28 *** 0.21 *** 
          
Adj-R2 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 
 
Note: In Table 5 - A and B the regression models are estimated over the time period 2008.07-2010.02, while in Table 5 - C the end of the sample period 
is 2008.07-2010.01. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the parameters with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) consistent estimates 
of the standard errors are shown. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Crisis panel estimates, fixed effects 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
spreadit-1 0.73 *** 0.74 *** 0.74 *** 0.74 *** 
qit 0.76 ** 0.80 ** 0.92 ** 0.95 ** 
vixt 0.17 *** 0.16 *** 0.17 *** 0.15 *** 
liqit - -1.29 -1.30  -2.53 ** 
gindit - - 0.00 -0.004 
balit - - - -0.02 *** 
debtit - - - 0.00 
spreadtGR 0.03 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 
     
Test for FE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adj-R2 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 
Note: Specification (1) corresponds to the baseline model during the crisis period. Specification (2) augments 
the baseline model by the liquidity measure. Specifications (3) and (4) further add output growth differentials 
and the expected fiscal position variables. The regression models (1) and (2) are estimated over the time period 
2007.08-2010.02, while the end of the sample period is 2010.01 in (3) and (4). The panel members include 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Fixed effects panel estimates 
with GLS cross-section weights in order to account for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity are shown. Test for 
Fixed Effects (FE) shows the p-value for the null hypothesis of redundant fixed effects. The asterisks ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
 
 
countries. In line with the pre-crisis results, however, output growth differentials are not 
successful in explaining spreads since the relevant coefficient is statistically significant only 
in Ireland and, furthermore, does not have the expected sign.32 The rest of our findings 
remain robust, as real exchange rates, the VIX and the Greek spread, remain significant in 
most countries’ when the additional explanatory variables enter the regressions.  Results from 
panel estimation of the baseline model (now excluding Greece) and its extensions are 
presented in Table 6. These are in line with the time-series evidence since real exchange rate 
appreciation, higher global financial volatility and increases in the Greek spread exert a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the spreads of other eurozone countries during 
the crisis period. Furthermore, the effect from output growth differentials is statistically 
insignificant, while the liquidity effect on spreads is negative and significant at the 5% level 
using the most general specification (see specification 4 in Table 6).33 Expected fiscal 
position variables were not included in the time-series regressions because, due to their bi-
                                                 
32 An increase in the growth rate of industrial production (relative to Germany) should lead to lower spreads, 
hence a negative sign is expected. 
33 The difference in the statistical significance of market liquidity observed between the time-series and panel-
estimates for our crisis-period models can be explained by the limited variation in relative market shares of 
individual countries in total EMU debt observed over our sample period. In view of this limited variation, 
liquidity effects are expected to be better captured by the higher variation of relative market shares across 
member states. Indeed, our panel estimates in column (4) of Table 6 seem to be capture this effect.  
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annual frequency, there is limited variability in the time-series dimension during the crisis 
period. Hence, this motivates the use of a panel regression to estimate their impact on spreads 
over the crisis. The panel estimation results indicate that, as in the pre-crisis period, increases 
in expected deficits lead to higher spreads.  
 Overall, our findings in this section suggest that significant shifts have taken place in 
the market for euro-area government bonds since August 2007.  The evidence suggests that 
the predictive power of country-specific fundamentals and international risk conditions over 
spreads varies over time and is activated during the crisis period. It appears that the 
credit/debt crisis put a halt on ‘convergence trade’ and bond market participants start to 
differentiate between countries on the basis of macroeconomic risk reflected in 
competitiveness losses as well as liquidity risk, thereby putting pressure on the bonds of 
uncompetitive and/or small issuers. In terms of the theoretical model presented in section 3, 
this is consistent with a state of the world where EMU governments (with the exception of 
Greece, whose case is examined below) operate (at least up to February 2010) under L1 but γ1 
now takes a positive value. If this important change in the behaviour of investors persists over 
time then it will mark the ascent of a new era where losses of competitiveness are penalised 
by higher spreads. Such a development would be consistent with historic experience from the 
US states-debt market, where the New York City debt crisis in 1975 resulted into a 
permanent discrimination among USA states on the basis of the latter’s fiscal performance 
(see Schuknecht et al, 2010). A permanent increase in focus on national fiscal performance 
will increase the degree of market pressure on governments of less competitive eurozone 
members for fiscal consolidation and structural reforms to boost competitiveness and 
promote real convergence. Contagion from the Greek debt crisis and the withdrawal of the 
implicit EMU/German fiscal guarantee further intensify the need for urgent reforms in the 
periphery EMU countries.   
 
5.3  The Greek debt crisis 
 We now turn our attention to Greece, the country which sparked the EMU sovereign 
debt crisis in autumn 2009 and has since been at the centre of focus of investors and 
policymakers. Table 7 shows the OLS-HAC time-series estimates of the crisis baseline model 
and its variants for Greece. When the models are estimated over the entire crisis period (see 
columns 1 and 2 in Table 7), the results are at first sight non-plausible since the VIX and the 
real effective exchange rate are not strongly significant, while the bond market liquidity 
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measure does not have the expected negative sign. Adding the business cycle proxy, and 
removing the insignificant liquidity proxy from the model of Greek spreads leads to an 
improved specification with all the explanatory variables being statistically significant at the 
5% level, or less (see columns 3 and 4 in Table 7 ). Note that unlike other EMU countries, the 
coefficient of output growth differentials is negative and significant, indicating that Greek 
spreads react positively to a slowdown in growth.  
As argued above, the lack of significance for international risk aversion and external 
competitiveness, captured by the VIX and real exchange rate respectively, in the benchmark 
specifications (columns 1 and 2) reported in Table 7 seem implausible given Greece’s central 
position in the eurozone debt crisis. These findings are likely to be the result of econometric 
misspecification due to the omission of variables capturing the double regime-switch 
occurring over the period November 2009 – February 2010, as suggested by Arghyrou and 
Tsoukalas (2010). Hence, we re-estimated the Greek specifications over the sub-period 
August 2007 to October 2009, thereby excluding the months covered by the assumed shift in 
expectations. Doing so we obtain findings consistent with those of the other eurozone 
members, as both the Greek real exchange rate and the global risk factor are now found to be 
priced by bond markets with the theoretically expected signs (see columns 5 and 6 in Table 
7). Our next step is to test explicitly for the existence of the shift in expectations by 
incorporating a slope dummy for the coefficient of the real exchange rate taking the value of 
unity since November 2009.34 The results provide evidence in favour of a regime-switch in 
the relationship between spreads and the real exchange rate within the crisis-period, with the 
coefficient of the latter increasing since November 2009 (see columns 7 and 8 in Table 7). 
Given that in our analysis the real exchange rate measures overall macroeconomic 
performance, this suggests that Greek spreads have become more responsive to the overall 
state of Greek macro-fundamentals.35 
 
34 The dummy variable (D2009.11) is equal to 1 from November 2009 onwards, zero otherwise. The theoretical 
model in section 3 predicts a second shift in expectations in January/February 2010. However, with our 
estimation sample covering 2007.08-2010.02, it is not possible to capture this second regime shift using a 
second dummy, as thus applies only to two observations and turns out to be perfectly collinear with the first one.  
35 We have tested the statistical significance of the slope dummy variable on the coefficient of the real exchange 
rate term for all EMU countries. Unlike Greece, where this dummy was found significant with a positive sign, 
for the remaining EMU countries we obtained a small but statistically significant negative coefficient. The only 
exception was Ireland, for which the dummy was insignificant. These findings (available upon request), confirm 
that the negative shift in expectations discussed above is specific to Greece. The negative sign found for other 
countries is consistent with a substitution effect, according to which less risk-averse investors, still interested in 
higher returns reallocate their portfolios from the unacceptably high macroeconomic risk of Greek bonds to the 
more acceptable risk of other EMU countries. However, the very small values found for the coefficient of this 
slope dummy, as well as the observed movements in spreads, suggest that this reallocation effect is too small to 
moderate the contagion effects reported in Tables 5 and 6.  
Table 7: Crisis time-series estimates for Greece, OLS -HAC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2007.08-2010.02 2008.08-2010.01 2007.08-2009.10 2007.08-2010.01 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
spreadt-1 1.54 *** 1.45 *** 1.38 *** 1.36 *** 0.75 *** 0.80 *** 0.88 *** 0.93 *** 
spreadt-2 -0.64 *** -0.67 *** -0.39 *** -0.43 *** - - - - 
qt 5.89 * 0.16 8.27 ** 6.08 * 5.07 ** 8.34 ** 4.35 ** 7.08 ** 
vixt 0.21 0.23 *  0.48 *** 0.47 *** 0.70 *** 0.71 *** 0.64 *** 0.65 *** 
liqt - 0.17 * - 0.06 - -0.10 - -0.08 
gindt - - -0.02 *** -0.02 ** - - -0.01 -0.01 
qt*D2009.11 - - -  - - 0.12 ** 0.12 ** 
         
Adj-R2 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Note: The sample periods over which the regression models are estimated are shown in the first row. We report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of 
the parameters with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) consistent estimates of the standard errors. The dummy variable (D2009.11) is equal to 1 
from November 2009 onwards and 0 otherwise. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Table 8: Explaining the Greek CDS, time-series estimates, OLS-HAC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2007.08-2010.02 2007.08-2009.10 2007.08-2010.01 2007.08-2010.01 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
CDSt-1 1.67 *** 0.62 *** 1.37 *** 0.97 *** 
CDSt-2 -0.81 *** - -0.30 * - 
qt 5.46 **  5.87 *** 7.31 ** 5.06 ** 
vixt 0.16  0.61 *** 0.38 ** 0.51 *** 
gindt - - -0.03 *** -0.02 *** 
qt*D2009.11 - - - 0.10 *** 
     
Adj-R2 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.96 
Note: The sample periods over which the regression models are estimated are shown in the first row. We report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of 
the parameters with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) consistent estimates of the standard errors. The dummy variable (D2009.11) is equal to 1 
from November 2009 onwards and 0 otherwise. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
 
 36 
We repeated our estimations for Greece defining the dependent variable as the Greek 
Credit Default Swap (CDS) spread versus Germany (the results of a similar exercise for the 
rest of the EMU members are discussed in section 5.4 below). The CDS is a credit derivative 
which allows the buyer to purchase insurance against the risk of default.36 During the Greek 
debt crisis, both government bond yield spreads and CDS spreads widened raising questions 
about the role that trading in the CDS market has played in these developments.37 Our 
findings from the CDS-model time-series estimation are reported in Table 8. They indicate 
that Greek CDS spreads during the crisis period reflect global financial instability as well as 
business cycle risk and external competitiveness considerations (see columns 1, 2 and 3 in 
Table 8). Furthermore, the post-November 2009 regime shift in expectations is confirmed by 
the statistical significance of the slope dummy variable associated with the real exchange rate 
(see column 4 in Table 8). Note that unlike columns (7) and (8) in Table 7, where the 
inclusion of the slope dummy variable rendered industrial production growth marginally 
insignificant, industrial production now remains significant at the 5% level even after the 
inclusion of the  dummy variable (see column 4 in Table 8).  
These findings reject the hypothesis that CDS spreads do not reflect any country-
specific or international fundamentals and simply react positively to past increases in their 
level. Excluding the first lag of the CDS spread, which captures momentum-trading, from our 
preferred specification reported in column 4 in Table 8 does not change our results and yields 
an adjusted R2 equal to 75%. Repeating the same experiment for the corresponding equation 
modelling the Greek government bond yield spread yields an adjusted R2 of 80% (full results 
available upon request). The high explanatory power of the models obtained after removing 
the lagged dependent variable from the set of regressors provides further evidence that 
international risk and macro-fundamentals explain most of the variation in Greek sovereign 
bond and CDS spreads during the crisis period.  
Overall, our finding are consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model by 
Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010), according to which by early 2010 Greek spreads were 
reflecting substantial default risk and currency risk, which were strongly reinforcing each 
                                                 
36 The buyer of a CDS contract on sovereign bonds agrees to make regular payments (CDS premium) to the 
seller in return for a payment by the seller if the credit event (default of the reference entity) occurs. The CDS 
spread is equal to the total amount that the buyer pays per year divided by the total face value of the bonds. 
37 The hypothesis that speculators operating through the CDS market reinforced the Greek debt crisis has 
received strong support from euro-area political leaders. According to this hypothesis, buyers of sovereign CDS 
contracts raise the cost of insurance against sovereign default leading to rises in the underlying government 
bond yield spreads. This increases debt interest costs making default more probable. Consequently, CDS spreads 
widen further thereby generating a new episode in the vicious cycle of rising insurance and borrowing costs. 
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other, making it very difficult to distinguish between the two, as previously discussed. 
Another element differentiating Greece from other periphery EMU members is that Greece is 
the only country for which markets may price the state of the business cycle. This is 
consistent with the view that markets assign an additional premium in Greek bonds, reflecting 
doubts regarding the ability of Greek authorities to push through the reforms necessary to 
achieve the required macro-adjustment within an environment of deepening economic 
recession. This finding, combined with the one regarding a Greek-specific negative shift in 
market expectations, suggest that the Greek debt crisis is as much a problem of trust as it is 
one of economics. Finally, our findings confirm that Greek CDS spreads are determined by 
the same fundamentals that drive Greek bonds yield spreads. This is a strong indication 
against the hypothesis that spreads in the bond market are driven by momentum-based 
speculative trading in the CDS market unrelated to developments in the Greek economy.  
 
5.4  Robustness tests  
We tested the robustness of our findings in a number of ways. To save space the 
results are not reported but are available upon request.  First, we repeated the estimation of 
our crisis-period benchmark model for all EMU countries using CDS spreads instead of bond 
yield spreads.38 The findings obtained both from time-series and panel estimations are 
consistent with those reported in section 5.2 for bond yield spreads as they confirm the 
significance of real exchange rates, international risk and contagion from Greece in 
explaining CDS spreads during the crisis period. The marginal contribution of lagged CDS 
spreads to the explanatory power of the model is typically small. Overall, the findings 
obtained from modelling CDS spreads offer further support to the argument that the main 
drivers of the EMU debt crisis are international risk, macro-fundamentals and contagion 
rather than momentum-trading speculation in the CDS market.   
Second, we excluded the first lag of spreads from the set of regressors in our 
benchmark model. For the post-crisis period the estimation results remain unaltered. For the 
pre-crisis period we obtain more instances of mispricing of competitiveness (i.e. more 
negative and statistically significant real exchange rate coefficients) with all other findings 
remaining unchanged.39 Hence, this experiment yields even stronger evidence of a switch in 
the market’s pricing behaviour towards a fundamentals-based model.  
                                                 
38 Ireland was excluded from this part of the analysis due to the small number of available observations.  Ten-
year CDS data on Irish contracts is available since 29/01/2009.  
39 Note that the resulting residuals from almost all equations (pre-crisis and crisis models) are stationary. 
 38
Finally, we estimated our benchmark model using alternative measures of the global 
risk factor. We experimented with US corporate spreads as in Codogno et al. (2003), 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Schuknecht et al. (2009, 2010). Our findings remain 
similar to those obtained using the VIX. The VIX, however, is found to dominate corporate 
spreads as an indicator of global risk in our yield spreads regressions. We also experimented 
with a measure of European implied stock market volatility, the VSTOXX, calculated using 
implied option prices written on the DJ Euro STOXX 50 index.  Using the VSTOXX we 
obtain similar results to those obtained using the VIX (see also Beber et al., 2009). 
 
6.   Summary and concluding remarks   
This paper offered a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Compared to existing studies our paper is the first to base its empirical analysis on a 
theoretical model of the eurozone crisis, namely the one by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). 
We use data of monthly frequency, as well as time series and panel estimation techniques, to 
model the spreads of 10-year EMU government bonds against Germany during the pre- and 
post-crisis periods, respectively covering January 1999 – July 2007 and August 2007 – 
February 2010. We obtain a number of novel and interesting findings which can be 
summarised as follows: First, during the pre-crisis period, with the possible exception of 
expected fiscal deficits, markets did not price macro-fundamentals and international risk 
conditions. Second, during the crisis period, markets have been pricing both factors on a 
country-by-country basis. Third, and in relation to the country at the epicentre of the EMU 
debt crisis, Greece, our findings support the hypothesis by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) 
explaining the escalation of the Greek debt crisis in November 2009 as the result of an 
unfavourable country-specific shift in market expectations, increasing further the penalty 
already imposed by markets due to the country’s deteriorating macroeconomic performance. 
Fourth, up to point covered by our analysis (February 2010), the overwhelming majority of 
EMU countries have experienced contagion from Greece, most prominently Portugal, Ireland 
and Spain.  Finally, we do not find evidence in favour of significant speculation effects on 
EMU spreads, neither through a direct nor an indirect, contagion channel.  
Our findings support the ‘convergence trade’ hypothesis for the pre-crisis period, 
according to which markets were discounting only the best-case scenario of full convergence 
to German fundamentals, even for countries displaying a clear deterioration of their macro-
fundamentals. This can be explained as the result of three factors: First, conditions of amble 
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global liquidity and low risk over the best part of the past decade; second, expectations that 
accession to the euro would result in growth-inducing reforms in periphery EMU economies; 
and third lack of a mechanism establishing credibility for the “no-bail out” clause of the 
Maastricht Treaty. With the benefit of hindsight, it can now be argued that markets were 
operating under a perceived implicit guarantee according to which there was very little 
default risk associated with investment in EMU sovereign bonds, rendering them a “heads-
you-win, tails-you-do-not-lose” bet. Combined with the absence of an effective EU-
sponsored mechanism of economic monitoring imposing reform this relaxed market pressure 
on EMU governments to improve fundamentals, which in turn resulted into further real 
divergence within the eurozone. The increasing un-sustainability of this divergence was 
bound to result into a change in market behaviour. The trigger for the latter was the onset of 
the global credit crunch in 2007 which prompted markets to switch to a more rational bond 
pricing model largely based on idiosyncratic macro-fundamentals. If this important change in 
the behaviour of investors persists over time, as it did in the US following the New York debt 
crisis in 1975, then it will mark the ascent of a new era where markets will be imposing much 
higher penalties on macro-imbalances. As a result, although a gradual normalisation of the 
global economic outlook may narrow EMU spreads, as long as intra-EMU macro-imbalances 
persist spreads are likely to remain in high, by historical standards, levels.  
Our empirical findings lead to policy implications both at the national as well as the 
union level which are directly traceable to the theoretical model discussed in section 3. First, 
for EMU-periphery countries spreads to decline a marked improvement in fiscal position and 
external competitiveness appears necessary. Second, periphery EMU countries, and Greece in 
particular, must pursue a reversal of private expectations to a more favourable status than the 
present one.40 In other words, governments must maintain, and in the case of Greece regain, 
the confidence of markets that they are fully committed to a permanent improvement in 
macro-fundamentals. Such a shift in expectations can only be achieved through the 
announcement of a credible and realistic reforms strategy, backed by unequivocal evidence of 
its determined implementation. In the absence of strong signals on behalf of periphery 
governments that they are determined to implement the necessary reforms, even in the face of 
significant short-term welfare losses, it is very likely that markets will continue to doubt the 
                                                 
40 The first policy recommendation corresponds to achieving values of q closer to the axes’ origin; while the 
second one implies starting from L2 or L3 to achieve a shift back to L1. Both developments imply a lower cost of 
continued EMU participation, i.e. a narrowing of spreads.  
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sustainability of these countries’ long-term participation in the EMU, and the risk that these 
expectations will become self-fulfilling will remain.  
At the union level, the crisis has highlighted the necessity of institutional reforms in 
two directions. First, to prevent a future crisis similar to the current one, the eurozone must 
develop effective mechanisms of fiscal supervision and policy co-ordination. Second, if a 
debt crisis does occur in an EMU country, it is important to prevent its escalation in the 
affected country and its contagion to other countries.41 This objective can be achieved 
through the creation of an EMU-run permanent mechanism of emergency financing. For such 
a mechanism to be successful in stabilising expectations, its rules and terms must be 
transparent and known ex-ante. At the same time, the terms of emergency finance must be 
such as to eliminate the risk of moral hazard discouraging fiscal discipline and necessary 
reforms. Identifying rules achieving both objectives simultaneously is a challenging task 
calling for significant attention from academics and policy-makers alike. Recent proposals 
calling for the introduction of a competitiveness pact, more binding fiscal rules, and the 
creation of a permanent European emergency finance mechanism ultimately allowing for an 
orderly default of EMU members move towards the direction of establishing a credible 
deterministic endgame. 
Finally, a note is due relating to future research. Following the announcement of the 
Greek bailout package and the establishment of the EFSF in May 2010, the EMU sovereign 
debt crisis has now entered a new phase, marked by the Irish bailout in November 2010, 
increased market pressure on Portuguese bonds and extensive public debate regarding the 
possibility of extending the terms of reference of the EFSF. These events raise the spectrum 
of multiple and reverse contagion effects, running among Greece, Ireland and Portugal as 
well as from each of these countries to the rest of the EMU countries. Our analysis in this 
paper covers a period of time up to which one may plausibly argue that developments relating 
to the EMU sovereign debt crisis were predominantly driven by the Greek debt crisis, in 
which case contagion could be plausibly approximated by the Greek spread alone.  With 
events still unfolding, future research would not only be useful to update the findings of the 
present study but, perhaps more importantly, to identify and measure the size of each of the 
possible multiple contagion channels, as well as their combined effect on European sovereign 
bond yields.  
 
41 These recommendations are also traceable to the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). The 
first aims to prevent an increase in the value of q to levels resulting in a cost of staying in the eurozone beyond 
the critical threshold defined by C. The second aims to prevent changes in expectations moving countries from 
L1 to L2 or L3.  
APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1: Pre-crisis time-series estimates, SUR, baseline 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
spreadt-1 0.89 *** 0.83 *** 0.86 *** 0.75 *** 0.89 *** 0.81 *** 0.87 *** 0.75 *** 0.88 *** 0.88 *** 
qt -0.11 -0.26 ** -0.11 -0.07 -0.01 -0.12 ** -0.03 -0.14 ** -0.11 -0.13 
vixt 0.02 0.02 * 0.03 ** 0.01 ** 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 ** -0.01 0.01 
           
Adj-R2 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.83 0.98 0.93 0.85 0.88 0.93 0.96 
 
 
Note: A system of equations, representing the pre-crisis baseline model in each country, is estimated over the time period 2001.01-2007.07. Seemingly unrelated regression 
method (SUR) estimates of the system’s parameters correcting for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations are shown. The asterisks 
***, **, * indicate the 1, 5, 10% level of significance respectively. 
 
 
Table A2: Crisis time-series estimates, SUR, baseline 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
spreadt-1 0.55 *** 0.51 *** 0.60 *** 0.53 *** 0.77 *** 0.39 *** 0.60 *** 0.35 *** 0.44 *** 
qt 4.10 *** 1.25 ** 1.82 *** 1.54 ** 0.89 4.45 *** 1.87 *** 3.34 * 2.20 *** 
vixt 0.29 *** 0.25 *** 0.22 *** 0.15 *** 0.31 *** 0.45 *** 0.22 *** 0.19 *** 0.19 *** 
spreadtGR 0.09 *** 0.07 *** 0.02 0.04 *** 0.19 *** 0.12 *** 0.01 0.27 *** 0.15 *** 
          
Adj-R2 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.96 
 
Note: A system of equations, representing the crisis baseline model in each country (apart from Greece), is estimated over the time period 2007.08-2010.02. Seemingly 
unrelated regression method (SUR) estimates of the system’s parameters correcting for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations are 
shown. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the 1, 5, 10% level of significance, respectively. 
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